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Abstract 
In many countries, distribution grid tariffs are being reformed to adapt to the new realities of an 
electricity system with distributed energy resources. In Europe, legislative proposals have been made to 
harmonize these reforms across country borders. Many stakeholders have argued that distribution tariffs 
are a local affair, while the EU institutions argued that there can be spillovers to other countries, which 
could justify a more harmonized approach. In this paper, we quantify these spillovers with a simplifed 
numerical example to give an order of magnitude. We look at different scenarios, and find that the 
spillovers can be both negative and positive. We also illustrate that the relative size of the countries is 
an important driver for the signifcance of the effects. To be able to quantify these effects, we developed 
a long-run market equilibrium model that captures the wholesale market effects of distribution grid 
tariffs. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game involving consumers, generating 
companies and distribution system operators in a stylized electricity market. 
Keywords 
Distribution grid tariff design, Distributed energy resources, Non-cooperative game, Mixed 
complementarity problem, Spillovers 
 
Nomenclature
Sets
A Set of agents in the non-cooperative game, indexed by a.
I Set of countries, indexed by i.
J Set of residential consumer segments, indexed by j.
K Set of conventional generator technologies, indexed by k.
T Set of time steps, indexed by t.
Parameters
cappvi,j Maximum PV capacity that can be installed by consumer Ci,j, MW.
capsi,j Maximum storage capacity that can be installed by consumer Ci,j, MWh.
CR C-rate of a storage system, MW/MWh.
CT Cost of transmission, e/MWh.
DCtoti Total annual (sunk) costs of the distribution system operator in country i, e.
Dnrest,i Non-residential electricity demand at time step t, MWh.
Dt,i,j Electricity demand of consumer Ci,j at time step t, MWh.
EC Charging efficiency of a storage system, -.
ED Discharging efficiency of a storage system, -.
ICconvk Annualized investment cost of conventional generating technology k, e/MW.
ICpv Annualized investment cost of PV, e/MW.
ICs Annualized investment cost of storage, e/MWh.
ICw Annualized investment cost of a wind turbine, e/MW.
LFwt,i Load factor of wind turbines at time step t, -.
LFpvt,i Load factor of PV at time step t, -.
Ni,j Number of residential consumers belonging to segment j in country i, -.
ufixi Binary parameter determining if fixed tariff structure is imposed in country i, -.
unmi Binary parameter determining if volumetric tariff structure with net-metering is
imposed in country i, -.
updi Binary parameter determining if peakd demand-based tariff structure is imposed
in country i, -.
VCk Variable cost of generating technology k, e/MWh.
Primal Variables
λt,i Electricity market clearing price in country i at time step t, e/MWh.
at,i Electricity imported by country i at time step t, MWh.
capconvi,k Installed capacity of conventional generator technology k in country i, MW.
cappvi,j PV capacity installed by consumer Ci,j, MW.
capsi,j Storage capacity installed by consumer Ci,j, MWh.
capwi Installed capacity of wind turbines in country i, MW.
cht,i,j Energy charged to storage system of consumer Ci,j at time step t, MWh.
dct,i,j Energy discharged from storage system of consumer Ci,j at time step t, MWh.
et,i,j Energy content of storage system of consumer Ci,j at time step t, MWh.
ft Electricity transported over transmission line at time step t, MWh.
gconvt,i,k Electricity generated by conventional generator technology k in country i at time
step t, MWh.
gpvt,i,j Electricity generated by PV system of consumer Ci,j at time step t, MWh.
gwt,i Electricity generated by wind turbines in country i at time step t, MWh.
tarfixi Distribution tariff under the fixed tariff structure in country i, e/year.
tarnmi Distribution tariff under the volumetric net-metering tariff structure in country
i, e/MWh.
tarpdi Distribution tariff under the peakd demand-based tariff structure in country i,
e/MW.
wneti,j Net withdrawal of consumer Ci,j over all time steps t ∈ T , MWh.
wpeaki,j Peak withdrawal from or injection into the grid of consumer Ci,j at one time step
t, MW.
wt,i,j Electricity withdrawn from the grid by consumer Ci,j at time step t, MWh.
1. Introduction
Traditional volumetric distribution grid tariffs, especially in combination with net-metering
policies, have caused welfare transfers between consumers and cost recovery problems for
distribution system operators (DSOs) (Eid et al., 2014). To address these challenges, re-
searchers, regulators and DSOs have proposed other, more cost-reflective distribution tar-
iff designs with different combinations and implementations of fixed, volumetric and peak
demand-based charges (Abdelmotteleb et al., 2018; Hledik and Greenstein, 2016; Borenstein,
2016). At the same time, the European Commission proposes to harmonize transmission
and distribution grid tariff designs on the European level in its Clean Energy Package (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2016). These network tariffs are currently set autonomously by the
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) across Europe. The European Commission argues
that unharmonized distribution tariff design may distort the level playing field on the in-
ternal electricity market in Europe as production is increasingly decentralized. Indeed,
distribution grid tariffs may be seen as a form of state aid for distributed energy resources
(DERs). On top of this, there may be spillover effects of distribution tariffs in neighboring
countries, i.e., the welfare of consumers and the business case for DERs in a country may
be impacted by the distribution grid tariff design imposed in a neighboring country. Many
stakeholders have, however, argued that distribution grid tariff design should remain a na-
tional prerogative (CEER, 2017; CEDEC, 2017; Eurelectric, 2017). Eurelectric (2017), for
instance, agrees that transmission tariffs should be harmonized to safeguard a level playing
field, but argues that this is not necessary for distribution tariffs as they are “closely linked
to local specificities”.
The interaction between distribution tariff structures and DER investment has been
studied extensively. Many researchers focus on volumetric net-metering tariffs that incen-
tivize investments in photovoltaics (PV) (Simshauser, 2016; Eid et al., 2014; Laws et al.,
2017; Brown and Sappington, 2017). Simshauser (2016) finds that net-metering policies in
Southeast Queensland in Australia have led to significant welfare transfers from non-solar
to solar households, thus forming an “implicit subsidy” for PV. He argues for a tariff with a
large peak demand-based component to replace the current tariffs. Schittekatte et al. (2018),
however, show how peak demand-based tariffs incentivize inefficient storage investment if
the DSO’s costs are sunk. All aforementioned research does not regard the possible impact
of these distribution tariffs on other countries. To fill this gap, this work focuses on the
spillover effects of distribution grid tariffs in neighboring, interconnected countries through
coupled wholesale markets. To this end, we model the interaction between consumers,
generating companies and distribution system operators in a simplified wholesale electric-
ity market, spanning two interconnected countries, as a non-cooperative game. For each
country, we consider active consumers (who can invest in PV and storage) and passive con-
sumers (who cannot invest). The proposed model, formulated as a mixed complementarity
problem (MCP), considers the investments in large-scale generation capacity by generat-
ing companies and the DER investments by active consumers to arrive at a competitive
long-run equilibrium of the electricity market. The NRAs in each country impose one of
three distinct distribution grid tariff designs, i.e., a tariff consisting of a fixed charge (FIX),
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a tariff consisting of a peak demand charge (PD) and a tariff consisting of a volumetric
charge with net-metering (NM), in order to recover the sunk costs of the DSO. The disjoint
implementation of three possible distribution tariffs in two countries leads to nine possible
scenarios.
The contribution of this work is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to quantify the spillover effects of distribution grid tariffs. Second, we make a model-
ing contribution. We develop a long-run market equilibrium model which takes into account
distribution tariffs in the decision-making problems of consumers. In the academic literature
studying distribution grid tariff design, wholesale markets are typically not modeled and the
energy component of the retail tariff is consequently assumed fixed (Schittekatte et al., 2018;
Abdelmotteleb et al., 2018). Brown and Sappington (2017, 2018) allow the electricity tariff,
including both network and energy charges, to vary, but they model a vertically-integrated
utility, not a wholesale market. The application of an equilibrium modeling technique in the
field of distribution grid tariff design is novel and, contrary to the aforementioned methodolo-
gies, allows analyzing the spillover effects of distribution grid tariffs, as they occur through
market interactions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the market equilibrium
model is developed. In Section 3, we present the results of a case study. Finally, we provide
policy implications and conclusions in Section 4.
2. Methodology
The model presented in this section is a non-cooperative game, with coupling constraints
imposed by distribution cost recovery at country-scale and endogenous determination of the
wholesale market price. First, we detail the modeling approach (Section 2.1). Subsequently,
we formally define the non-cooperative game in Section 2.2. The mathematical formulation
is presented in Section 2.3. Finally, the solution procedure is detailed in Section 2.4.
2.1. Modeling approach
On one hand, our model is inspired by traditional electricity market equilibrium models
(Gabriel et al., 2013). The model output mimics the long-run equilibrium in a wholesale
electricity market. In our case specifically, the market spans two countries interconnected by
a transmission line, in which price-taking generators and consumers participate, facilitated
by market clearing agents and a market coupling agent. Market equilibrium models have
been often applied to analyze market design and/or policy measures in the power sector. For
example, Ho¨schle et al. (2018) and Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011) develop stochastic market
equilibrium models to analyze capacity markets. Saguan and Meeus (2014) analyze the
costs of renewable energy using a market equilibrium model representing two interconnected
countries for four states of the world: with national and international transmission planning,
and with and without renewable energy trade. Zhao et al. (2010) analyze the efficiency
of multiple systems for allocating emission allowances with a market equilibrium model,
representing an energy, capacity and emission allowance market.
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On the other hand, our model is inspired by the game-theoretic model of Schittekatte
et al. (2018), who formulate a game between residential consumers trying to shift distri-
bution costs to other consumers under a sunk DSO cost recovery constraint. We model a
perfectly regulated revenue-constrained DSO that is able to recover its sunk costs by setting
the distribution tariff in concert with the NRA. As a result, residential consumers play a
non-cooperative game, in which they can shift distribution costs to other consumers. The
distribution tariff structure is exogenously set by the NRA before the game, i.e., only the
level of the tariff is considered in the non-cooperative game. If a consumer manages to
reduce his distribution costs, this leads to an increase of the distribution costs of the other
consumers because the DSO can adapt the tariff to ensure cost recovery. Under a peak
demand-based tariff structure, for instance, an active consumer may install storage to re-
duce his peak demand and thus his distribution costs. The DSO, monitored by the NRA,
must then increase the distribution tariff to compensate this loss of revenue. This may cause
the aforementioned active consumer to adapt his strategy. He could, for instance, install
more storage. Finally, in the long-run equilibrium, the tariffs will be set exactly so that all
costs are recovered, taking into account the actions of active consumers.
The model output can be interpreted as a generalized Nash equilibrium of a non-
cooperative game between the aforementioned agents, i.e., generators, residential consumers,
market clearing agents, a market coupling agent and the DSOs. The game is schematically
presented in Figure 1.
The model is highly stylized due to, i.a., a number of simplifying assumptions. We
assume that all consumers and generators are price-takers and that all demand is inelastic.
We consider an energy-only market without a price cap or other market imperfections. Short-
term uncertainty and operating reserves are not considered. Both countries are connected by
a transmission line with a non-binding capacity. In order to make the location of generating
and storage technologies meaningful, however, we add a linear transmission cost.1 The
market is cleared hourly, and we assume that residential consumers pay the hourly wholesale
electricity prices for their energy use. They only consider their energy and distribution costs,
along with their investments costs. Other cost components, e.g., a retail margin, taxes, etc.
are disregarded. Residential consumers are unable to disconnect from the grid. We only
consider sunk distribution network costs. This entails that the distribution network costs do
not change regardless of the actions of consumers. This sunk cost assumption is justified by
(i) massive policy costs being thrust upon DSOs, and (ii) more fundamentally, because the
traditional ’fit-and-forget’ approach of distribution grid planning has led to over-dimensioned
grids with large capital costs (Pollitt, 2018). Finally, we assume that the DSO is perfectly
1We choose this cost as such that there is no impact on the costs of consumers and that transmission
is never a barrier to install generation and/or DER capacity in a particular country, if there is a clear
incentive to do so. In our work, these incentives will follow from the imposed distribution tariff structures.
However, the transmission cost will ensure a “logical” distribution of generation and DER capacities if the
model - without the transmission costs - would be indifferent to the location of the new investment. If both
countries are the same size and have imposed the same distribution tariffs, for instance, the generation and
DER capacities will be equal in each country. Without the transmission cost, the location of the generation
and DER capacities would be arbitrary in this instance.
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Figure 1: Schematic overview of the non-cooperative game (2)-(28), with references to the optimization
problems of the agents (cf. Section 2.3) and the coupling variables. The agents in the second country i′ are
structured the same as the visualized agents belonging to country i. All agents in one country are linked by
the market clearing price, determined hourly by the market clearing agent. Both countries are linked by the
market coupling agent who arbitrages between both markets. The residential consumers in each country are
linked by the optimization problem of the DSO, who attempts to fulfill his cost recovery annually.
regulated, implying that the NRA’s estimation of the DSO’s costs correspond to the DSO’s
actual costs.
2.2. Formal definition of non-cooperative game
In this section, we formally define the non-cooperative game. This general formulation
shows that the game can be defined for any number of countries and consumer segments,
while it facilitates the mathematical formulation of Section 2.3. We define the set of agents
in the non-cooperative game as A := (Ci ,j )i∈I,j∈J ∪ (Gi ,k)i∈I,k∈K ∪ (Ri)i∈I ∪ {MCLi}i∈I ∪
{MCO} ∪ {DSOi}i∈I . There are a finite number of representative consumers Ci,j, each
representative consumer representing the Ni,j identical consumers belonging to a certain
consumer segment j ∈ J in a certain country i ∈ I. There are a finite number of con-
ventional generators Gi,k aggregated per country i ∈ I and generator type k ∈ K. In each
country, there is one aggregated renewable (wind) generator Ri. The markets are cleared by
national market clearing agents MCLi and coupled by a market coupling agent MCO. In
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each country, there is also one DSO, DSOi, who sets the distribution tariff in that country.
For every agent a ∈ A, Xa is its set of strategies. Then X := ×a∈AXa denotes the set of
all possible combinations of strategies that can be chosen by the agents in A. Each agent
a ∈ A has a utility function defined as Πa : X → R.
The non-cooperative game between the aforementioned agents is denoted as Γ :
(A,X , (Πa)a∈A) in which each agent selfishly maximizes its utility Πa, subject to a set
of constraints. As we show in Section 2.3.6, the solution space of each DSO’s optimization
problem depends on the strategies of the residential consumers. In other words, decision
variables of the residential consumers appear in the constraints of the DSO’s optimization
problem. This requires interpreting this setting as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem.
Let χ−a be the vector of strategies of all the agents in A, except agent a. Then, given the
strategies of the other agents in A, each agent a ∈ A simultaneously solves:
max
χa∈Xa(χ−a)
Πa(χa, χ−a) (1)
Each agent thus solves an optimization problem, of which the general form is given
by Eq. (1). All agents in each country i are coupled through the optimization problem
of the market clearing agent MCLi who determines the wholesale electricity prices λt,i.
Both markets are coupled by the market coupling agent MCO who arbitrages between
both markets. In addition, residential consumers in each country are coupled through the
optimization problem of the national DSO, DSOi, who sets the distribution tariff. The
generalized Nash equilibrium of this problem corresponds to a state in which no agent can
unilaterally improve its utility, by adapting its strategy χa, given the strategies of the other
agents χ−a.
2.3. Mathematical formulation
In this section, the decision-making problems of all agents are presented in detail. The
dual variables associated with each constraint are given between brackets. Contrary to the
previous section, we move back to the specific setting of our work in which we consider two
countries and two consumer segments (active and passive). This allows a straightforward
formulation of the optimization problem of the market coupling agent (Section 2.3.5), while
the formulations of the optimization problems of the other agents remain general.
2.3.1. Residential consumers
The decision variables of each representative consumer Ci,j are his PV investment cap
pv
i,j,
his storage investment capsi,j, the energy produced by his PV system g
pv
t,i,j, the energy stored
in his storage system et,i,j, the energy charged to or discharged from his storage system cht,i,j
and dct,i,j, the energy withdrawn from or injected into the grid wt,i,j
2 and the DSO’s billing
variables wneti,j and w
peak
i,j . Each consumer Ci,j solves the optimization problem (2)-(16):
2A consumer injects into the grid if wt,i,j 6 0.
5
Spillover Effects of Distribution Grid Tariffs in the Internal Electricity Market: An Argument for Harmonization?
Minimize
∑
t∈T
λt,i ·wt,i,j + ICpv ·cappvi,j + ICs ·capsi,j + ufixi ·tarfixi
+ unmi ·tarnmi ·wneti,j + updi ·tarpdi ·wpeaki,j (2)
subject to
wt,i,j = Dt,i,j+cht,i,j−dct,i,j−gpvt , ∀t∈T (αt,i,j) (3)
0 6 gpvt,i,j 6 LFpvt,i ·cappvi,j, ∀t∈T (β-t,i,j, β+t,i,j) (4)
et,i,j = et−1,i,j + cht,i,j ·EC− dct,i,j/ED, ∀t∈T \{1} (γt,i,j) (5)
e1,i,j = cap
s
i,j/2 + ch1,i,j ·EC− dc1,i,j/ED, (γ1,i,j) (6)
eT,i,j = cap
s
i,j/2, (δi,j) (7)
0 6 et,i,j 6 capsi,j, ∀t∈T (-t,i,j, +t,i,j) (8)
0 6 cht,i,j 6 CR·capsi,j, ∀t∈T (ζ -t,i,j, ζ+t,i,j) (9)
0 6 dct,i,j 6 CR·capsi,j, ∀t∈T (η-t,i,j, η+t,i,j) (10)
0 6 cappvi,j 6 cappvi,j, (θ-i,j, θ+i,j) (11)
0 6 capsi,j 6 capsi,j, (ι-i,j, ι+i,j) (12)∑
t∈T
wt,i,j 6 wneti,j , (κ1i,j) (13)
0 6 wneti,j , (κ2i,j) (14)
wt,i,j 6 wpeaki,j , ∀t∈T (µ1t,i,j) (15)
− wt,i,j 6 wpeaki,j , ∀t∈T , (µ2t,i,j) (16)
As the demand of each consumer is inelastic, maximizing his utility function corresponds
to minimizing his costs. Those costs, given by (2), are equal to the sum of his energy costs
(first term), investment costs (second and third term) and distribution costs (fourth, fifth
and sixth term). By assumption, the consumer is subjected to the real-time prices on the
wholesale market, i.e., his energy costs are the product of the energy consumed during each
hour multiplied by the market clearing price λt,i. If his consumption is negative, i.e., he
injects into the grid, he thus receives the wholesale electricity price for the injected energy.
The investment costs of the consumer are the result of investments in PV and storage,
depending on the annualized investment costs of these technologies ICpv and ICs. With
the exception of storage losses, we assume that these DERs do not have operational costs.
The NRA of each country i exogenously imposes the distribution tariff structure by setting
only one of the binary parameters ufixi , u
net
i and u
pd
i equal to 1. Under a distribution tariff
with a fixed charge (ufixi = 1), consumer Ci,j pays a yearly fixed amount to the DSO, equal
to tarfixi . Under a distribution tariff structure consisting of a volumetric charge with net-
metering (unmi = 1), the distribution costs of consumer Ci,j are proportional to w
net
i,j , defined
by (13)-(14), and the tariff tarnmi in e/kWh. Finally, under a distribution tariff structure
consisting of a peak-demand charge (updi = 1), the distribution costs of consumer Ci,j are
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proportional to wpeaki,j , defined by Eq. (15)-(16), and the tariff tar
pd
i in e/kW.
Constraint (3) gives the behind-the-meter energy balance of each consumer. The hourly
withdrawal from or injection into the grid of a consumer follows from his fixed demand Dt,i,j,
the energy (dis)charged from his storage system and the energy produced by his PV system.
Equation (4) limits the PV production to the installed capacity multiplied with the load
factor LFpvt,i in each time step. The inequality implies that consumers are able to curtail the
output of their PV system. Constraints (5)-(7) determine the evolution of the energy content
of the storage system in time. We impose cyclical boundary conditions. Equation (8) limits
the energy content to the installed storage capacity. The energy charged/discharged every
hour is limited by the installed storage capacity, multiplied with the C-rate CR (Eq. (9)-
(10)). Equations (11)-(12) limit the investment in PV and storage respectively. Constraints
(13) and (14) define the variable wneti,j which is used to bill the consumers under the volumetric
tariff structure with net-metering. If the net-metering tariff structure is imposed by the NRA
(unmi = 1), these constraints, along with the presence of w
net
i,j in the objective, make sure
that wneti,j is always equal to the net withdrawal over all time steps (
∑
t∈T wt,i,j) if the net
withdrawal is positive.3 This implementation corresponds to a net-metering tariff structure
with a rolling credit over all time steps t ∈ T (Eid et al., 2014). Constraints (15)-(16), along
with the presence of wpeaki,j in the objective, ensure that the variable w
peak
i,j , which is used
to bill the consumers under the peak demand-based tariff structure, is always equal to the
maximum hourly withdrawal or injection in the period spanned by t ∈ T if updi = 1.
2.3.2. Conventional generators
The decision variables of each conventional generatorGi,k are its installed capacity cap
conv
i,k
and its hourly generation gconvt,i,k . Each conventional generator solves the optimization problem
(17)-(19):
Maximize
∑
t∈T
(λt,i − VCk)·gconvt,i,k − ICconvk ·capconvi,k (17)
subject to
0 6 gconvt,i,k 6 capconvi,k , ∀t∈T (ν-t,i,k, ν+t,i,k) (18)
0 6 capconvi,k , (ξi,k) (19)
The objective of each generator (17) is to maximize its profit, equal to its revenues cor-
rected for its operational and investment costs. The revenues depend on the market clearing
price λt,i. The operational costs are proportional to the variable costs of the generator VCk
while the annualized investment costs are governed by ICconvk . Constraint (18) limits the
production to the installed generation capacity.
3If unmi = 1, w
net
i,j will always be chosen as small as possible, subject to constraints (13)-(14), as that
choice minimizes the objective considering the tariff tarnmi is never negative.
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2.3.3. Renewable generators
Because each renewable generator Ri can only invest in wind generation, its decision
variables are the installed capacity of wind turbines capwi and the hourly generation of those
wind turbines gwt,i considering the availability of this resource. Each renewable generator
solves the optimization problem (20)-(22):
Maximize
∑
t∈T
λt,i ·gwt,i − ICw ·capwi (20)
subject to
0 6 gwt,i 6 LFwt,i ·capwi , ∀t∈T (o-t,i, o+t,i) (21)
0 6 capwi , (pii) (22)
Similar to conventional generators, the objective of each renewable generator (20) is to
maximize its profit, equal to its revenues, which depend on the market clearing, corrected
for the investment costs, proportional to the annualized investment costs ICw. We assume
that wind generation has no variable costs. Constraint (21) limits the generation to the
installed capacity multiplied by the load factor LFwt,i. The renewable generator can curtail
its output.
2.3.4. Market clearing agents
Inspired by Ho¨schle et al. (2018), we define each market clearing agent MCLi explicitly
as an agent who sets the wholesale electricity prices λt,i, with the objective of minimizing
the imbalances on the national wholesale market. In the objective (23), the market clearing
equation of country i at each time step, between brackets, is multiplied by the corresponding
market clearing price λt,i. In the long-run equilibrium, the market clearing agent MCLi
will set the wholesale electricity prices as such that there is a balance between the sum of
residential and non-residential demand (Dnrest,i ) and the sum of all generation and import at
each time step. There are no constraints, implying that wholesale electricity prices are not
capped. The unconstrained optimization problem of MCLi is described by Eq. (23):
Minimize
∑
t∈T
(∑
k∈K
gconvt,i,k + g
w
t,i + at,i −Dnrest,i −
∑
j∈J
Ni,j ·wt,i,j
)
·λt,i (23)
2.3.5. Market coupling agent
Both market clearings are coupled by the market coupling agent MCO who arbitrages
perfectly between both countries. Inspired by Hobbs and Helman (2004), we model the
market coupling agent as an arbitraging agent with the objective of maximizing its profit
from arbitrage, taking into account transmission costs. The decision variables are the energy
imported into or exported from each country at,i
4, and the flow over the transmission line
ft. The market coupling agent solves the optimization problem (24)-(26):
4If at,i > 0, country i imports electricity, while a negative at,i implies export.
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Maximize
∑
t∈T
(∑
i∈I
(λt,i ·at,i)− CT·ft
)
(24)
subject to∑
i∈I
at,i = 0, ∀t∈T (ρt) (25)
ft > at,i, ∀t∈T , i∈I (σt,i) (26)
We assume a non-binding transmission capacity and a small linear transmission cost
CT in order to give a small location-specific signal for generation and DER investments.
Constraint (25) imposes conservation of energy, entailing that the import in one country
equals the export from the other country. Equation (26) determines the absolute electricity
flow over the transmission line, which governs the transmission costs.
2.3.6. Distribution system operators
We model each distribution system operator DSOi as a revenue regulated entity. The
decision variables of DSOi are the tariffs tar
fix
i , tar
nm
i and tar
pd
i that allow cost recovery,
dependent on the exogenously set distribution tariff structure (determined by the binary
parameters ufixi , u
nm
i and u
pd
i ). The optimization problem of DSOi is described by Eq.
(27)-(28):
Maximize
∑
j∈J
Ni,j ·
(
ufixi ·tarfixi + unmi ·tarnmi ·wneti,j + updi ·tarpdi ·wpeaki,j
)−DCtoti (27)
subject to∑
j∈J
Ni,j ·
(
ufixi ·tarfixi + unmi ·tarnmi ·wneti,j + updi ·tarpdi ·wpeaki,j
)
6 DCtoti , (φi) (28)
The DSO’s objective (27) is maximizing its profits, i.e. the revenues received from res-
idential consumers via the distribution tariff, corrected for its sunk costs DCtoti . However,
the DSO’s revenue is capped to its costs by the NRA (Eq. (28)). We disregard the profit
margin that an NRA would typically allow and assume that the NRA has complete informa-
tion.5 The revenue constraint (28) contains decision variables of the residential consumers,
wneti,j and w
peak
i,j , requiring a generalized Nash equilibrium solution concept as discussed in
Section 2.2. The presented formulation always leads to tariffs that ensure cost recovery, i.e.,
a zero-profit for the DSO, except if cost recovery is infeasible which only occurs if wneti,j = 0
or wpeaki,j = 0 for all consumers Ci,j.
6
5This assumption allows us to use the same cost parameter, DCtoti , in both the objective and the revenue
constraint. The objective contains the actual costs of the DSO while the revenue constraint contains the
NRA’s estimation of the DSO’s costs.
6This result can be derived from the KKT conditions of the optimization problem (27)-(28).
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2.4. Solution procedure
We approximate the generalized Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game (2)-(28)
via an iterative algorithm. The algorithm replaces the DSO optimization problems (27)-
(28), because bi-linear terms in those optimization problems do not allow reformulating the
complete game. Using this iterative algorithm, we determine the tariffs tarfixi , tar
nm
i and
tarpdi that ensure cost recovery, which is always obtained by the DSO if it is feasible, as
discussed in Section 2.3.6.
In each iteration, we solve a simplified version of the original non-cooperative game,
containing equations (2)-(26) and considering fixed tariffs tarfixi , tar
nm
i and tar
pd
i , hence
avoiding non-linearities. The simplified non-cooperative game can be reformulated as an
MCP, obtained by deriving the KKT conditions of the optimization problems of all agents.
The solution of the MCP can be obtained with the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) or,
under certain conditions, from an equivalent linear optimization problem (Poncelet, 2018).
In Appendix A.1, we present the equivalent linear optimization problem (A.1)-(A.22) of
the simplified non-cooperative game (2)-(26). To check that the optimization problem is
equivalent to the simplified non-cooperative game, we derive the KKT conditions from both
models in Appendix A.2. As they are identical, we conclude that both formulations are
equivalent. The linear optimization problem can be solved efficiently with an off-the-shelf
solver such as Gurobi. We prefer this solution procedure as it is significantly quicker for
larger instances than solving the MCP directly with PATH.
In the algorithm, we assume the role of the DSO in each country who sets the distribution
tariff in order to recover its sunk costs, taking into account the revenue cap. Under a fixed
distribution tariff structure (ufix = 1), the tariff can easily be set as all residential consumers
pay the same amount: tarfixi = DC
tot
i /
(∑
j∈J Ni,j
)
. The total sunk costs incurred by the
DSO are simply divided by the total number of residential consumers in country i. The
iterative algorithm is trivial in this case as the reformulated problem (A.1)-(A.22) is solved
once with the aforementioned value of tarfixi . Under a volumetric tariff structure with net-
metering (unm = 1) or a peak demand-based tariff structure (upd = 1), however, it is not
trivial to set the distribution tariff as the strategies of active consumers depend on the tariff.
We use an iterative algorithm to mimic the tariff-setting process, as proposed by Schittekatte
et al. (2018), which allows approximating the generalized Nash equilibrium.
As an example of this iterative process, we provide pseudo-code describing the algorithm
assuming that the NRA in country 1 imposes a net-metering tariff structure while the NRA
in country 2 imposes a peak demand-based tariff structure. By initializing the tariffs at
zero, increasing them in small steps (∆tar
nm
,∆tar
pd → 0) and only considering cases in which
there is at least one passive consumer with a non-zero demand in each country, we ensure
that the algorithm always converges. A passive consumer cannot adapt his net or peak
withdrawal implying that he can never avoid distribution costs. Even in the most extreme
case, in which active consumers avoid all distribution costs, there always exists a tariff which
ensures that all costs are recovered (in this extreme case, all costs are recovered from the
passive consumers). The resulting distribution tariffs are not necessarily the only tariffs
fulfilling the cost recovery constraints, but by slowly increasing the tariffs, we ensure that
the resulting tariffs are the lowest tariffs that fulfill them.
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Algorithm 1: Iterative algorithm for approximating the generalized Nash equilibrium
of non-cooperative game (2)-(28).
Input: All parameters belonging to non-cooperative game (2)-(28) (unm1 =1; u
pd
2 =1)
Output: Generalized Nash equilibrium of (2)-(28)
Initialize tariff in country 1: tarnm1 = 0;
while DCtot1 −
∑
j∈J N1,j ·tarnm1 ·wnet1,j 6 ·DCtot1 do
Initialize tariff in country 2: tarpd2 = 0;
while DCtot2 −
∑
j∈J N2,j ·tarpd2 ·wpeak2,j 6 ·DCtot2 do
Solve (A.1)-(A.22);
Increase tariff in country 2: tarpd2 = tar
pd
2 + ∆
tarpd ;
end
Solve (A.1)-(A.22);
Increase tariff in country 1: tarnm1 = tar
nm
1 + ∆
tarnm ;
end
3. Results
We analyze the spillover effects of distribution grid tariffs based on a numerical example,
described in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we give the results of one proxy for welfare and
two proxies for DER investments, for nine distribution tariff scenarios, in order to analyze
welfare and DER investment spillovers respectively.
3.1. Numerical example
3.1.1. Set-up
We consider two countries and two consumer segments: active and passive consumers in
the “reference country” and the “neighboring country”. All consumers belonging to the same
segment and country are assumed identical. Therefore, all consumers are represented by four
representative consumers, as described in Section 2.2. Active consumers are able to invest
in PV and storage while passive residential consumers are unable to do so. Consumers may
be passive for a variety of reasons: they rent so they cannot make the investment decision,
they have a limited budget, etc. We assume that each country consists for 50% of active and
50% of passive consumers. Both countries can only differ in two characteristics: the tariff
design which is set by the national regulator and the country size. We analyze two cases:
a base case with countries of equal size and a case in which the neighboring country is five
times larger (w.r.t. the total number of consumers) than the reference country. The second
case is relevant in the European context as there is a large variety of country sizes.
3.1.2. Data
All consumers have identical load profiles Dt,i,j, obtained from the 2017 Belgian synthetic
load profiles (SLPs) of residential consumers with a yearly demand of 3500 kWh (Syner-
grid, 2018). Note that synthetic load profiles are average consumer load profiles. Actual
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consumer load profiles are less smooth and have higher peaks. This will mainly influence
the operation and profitability of storage for residential consumers. The investment limits
for active consumers (cappv and caps) are set at 5 kW and 10 kWh respectively. If both
countries are the same size, both countries have 4.8 million residential consumers, similar
to Belgium. Consequently, both countries have 2.4 million active consumers and 2.4 million
passive consumers. The non-residential demand Dnrest,i is calculated by subtracting the resi-
dential demand from the total load profile of the Belgian power system in 2017, provided by
the Belgian TSO Elia (Elia, 2018). The annual residential demand in each country equals
16.8 TWh (3500 kWh times 4.8 million consumers), compared to a total system load of 87.1
TWh. The system load peak is 13.1 GW. For the case in which the neighboring country
is five times larger than the reference country, these quantities are multiplied by five for
the neighboring country. The wind and PV load factors LFwt,i and LF
pv
t,i are obtained by
normalizing the output of the Belgian solar PV and wind turbines in 2017 by the installed
capacity, both of which are provided by Elia (Elia, 2018). All simulations are performed on
a set of 12 representative days of the year 2017, selected via the method of Poncelet et al.
(2017).7 In order to recover their sunk costs, each DSO needs to recover e400 from each
consumer on average.8
There is no utility scale PV, i.e., all PV is installed by residential consumers. The
installation cost of PV is assumed to be 1000 e/kW with a lifetime of 20 years and a
discount rate of 5%. This cost assumption is lower than most estimates of current costs,
but as the costs are still decreasing rapidly they are realistic for the near future, especially
in Europe. The cost of residential PV up to 5 kW reached 1790 e/kW in Q2 of 2016 in
Germany, for instance, coming from 4500 e/kW in 2010 (IRENA, 2017b). For PV systems
between 5 and 10 kW, the cost in 2016 was already down to 1550 e/kW.9 Similar to PV, we
assume storage is only installed by residential consumers. The installation cost of storage is
assumed to be 200 e/kWh with a lifetime of 10 years and a discount rate of 5%. This cost is
in line with the low estimates for 2030 (IRENA, 2017a). We assume that each storage system
can be fully charged or discharged in 1 hour, i.e. their C-rate is equal to 1 MW/MWh. The
charging and discharging efficiency are both 95%.
All generation besides PV is installed at transmission level. For centralized generation,
we use the data of Ho¨schle et al. (2018). There is one renewable generation technology at
the transmission level: wind. It has an annualized investment cost of 76 500 e/MW and
no variable cost. There are three conventional generation technologies, i.e. base-, mid- and
7Poncelet et al. (2017) develop an optimization problem which allows selecting a number of days, along
with weights ascribed to each day, that are representative for a whole year. The optimization problem
minimizes the difference between the actual duration curve and the approximated duration curve constructed
using the selected days, taking into account the weight of each day. The optimization problem can take
into account multiple time series. We took into account the load curves of residential consumers, the total
system load curve, the wind load factor curve and the solar load factor curve.
8The distribution costs of the average consumer in Flanders in 2017 were e393 (VREG, 2017).
9In the United States, on the other hand, the costs are significantly higher: 5040 e/kW for PV systems
up to 5 kW and 4600 e/kW for PV systems between 5 and 10 kW (IRENA, 2017b). These costs are also
rapidly decreasing however.
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Technology Variable cost VCk (e/MWh) Annualized investment cost IC
conv
k (e/MW)
Base 36 138 000
Mid 53 82 000
Peak 76 59 000
Table 1: Variable and investment costs of the considered conventional generation technologies, obtained
from Ho¨schle et al. (2018).
peak-load generation. The variable and investment costs of these generation technologies
are presented in Table 1. Technical constraints, e.g., ramping, are not taken into account.
As discussed in Section 2.1, there is one transmission line between both countries with
a non-binding capacity and a small transmission cost. We set CT = 0.001 e/MWh, which
is large enough to give a location-specific investment signal, but does not distort other
investment incentives, i.e. distribution tariffs.
3.2. Results
In this section, we discuss the spillover effects in the reference country (R), of distribution
grid tariffs in the neighboring country (N), based on three proxies for nine distribution tariff
scenarios. The nine scenarios follow from the disjoint implementation of three distribution
tariff structures in both countries: a fixed tariff structure (FIX), a volumetric tariff structure
with net-metering (NM) and a peak demand-based tariff structure (PD). We distinguish two
types of spillovers: 1) welfare spillovers, 2) DER investment spillovers. Figure 2 presents
the total annual cost increase of residential consumers in the reference country compared to
a central planner reference scenario, serving as proxy for welfare.10 The total annual costs
are the sum of energy, distribution and annualized investment costs of all active and passive
consumers in the reference country. Figures 3 and 4 present the total installed PV and
storage capacities in the reference country, visualizing the DER investment spillover. The
results are displayed for the case in which both countries are of equal size (the black dots)
and for the case in which the neighboring country is five times larger than the reference
country (the grey dots). The shaded areas in the figures group the three scenarios for which
the tariff design in the reference country is the same. In each shaded area, there is one
harmonized tariff scenario (in which both countries impose the same tariff design), serving as
reference, and two unharmonized tariff scenarios (in which the neighboring country imposes
a different tariff design). The welfare and DER investment spillovers in the reference country,
10The central planner reference scenario refers to the “optimal” long-run equilibrium state of the electricity
system that would be obtained by a social welfare maximizing central planner. It is obtained by solving the
equivalent linear optimization problem of the non-cooperative game, (A.1)-(A.22), disregarding distribution
costs, i.e., leaving the terms
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J (u
fix
i ·tarfixi +uneti ·tarneti ·wneti,j +ucapi ·tarcapi ·wpeaki,j ) out of the objective
(A.1). The distribution costs are disregarded by the central planner, because they are sunk. Note that the
central planner scenario corresponds to the scenario with a fixed tariff in both countries as we discuss in
Section 3.2.1.
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Figure 2: Increase of total annual costs of residential consumers in the reference country (R) compared to
a central planner reference case.
Figure 3: Total PV investments by residential consumers in the reference country (R).
Figure 4: Total storage investments by residential consumers in the reference country (R).
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of unharmonized distribution tariffs in the neighboring country, are found by comparing the
scenarios with unharmonized tariffs to the harmonized tariff scenario within each shaded
area. In Sections 3.2.1-3.2.3, we discuss the results of each shaded area separately.
3.2.1. Fixed tariff in the reference country
We make four observations from Figures 2-4 (shaded, pink areas). First, concerning
welfare, the spillover effects of the neighboring country moving from a fixed tariff structure
towards a net-metering or peak demand-based tariff structure are positive (Fig. 2). Second,
PV investment is not impacted by the tariff design in the neighboring country (Fig. 3).
Third, storage investment increases when the neighboring country imposes a net-metering
tariff and decreases when the neighboring country imposes a peak demand-based tariff (Fig.
4). Finally, the size of the neighboring country has only a minor impact on the results.
Because the spillover effects are connected, we discuss the first three observations for each
tariff scenario separately in the following three paragraphs. In the final paragraph, we discuss
the impact of country size (i.e., the fourth observation).
Fixed tariff in neighboring country. As indicated in Figure 2, the scenario with harmonized
distribution grid tariff structures corresponds to the central planner reference scenario. This
results from the set-up of the model, i.e., representing an idealized electricity market, and
the sunk cost assumption. Under this assumption, the total distribution network costs DCtoti
can never be lowered which implies that only energy cost savings justify DER investment
from a social welfare perspective. Under a fixed distribution tariff, active consumers cannot
lower their distribution costs which implies that they only invest in PV and/or storage
if the subsequent energy cost savings outweigh the investment costs. This leads to the
optimal outcome from a social welfare perspective, disregarding other market imperfections.
Under our cost assumptions, PV is never installed in the reference country under a fixed
distribution tariff (Fig. 3). Storage investment is limited, equalling 0.8 GWh in the scenario
with harmonized tariffs. The storage systems are used to perform price arbitrage on the
wholesale market.
Peak demand-based tariff in neighboring country. Compared to the previous scenario with
harmonized distribution tariff structures, the costs of residential consumers in the reference
country decrease with 0.8% (Fig. 2). The peak demand-based tariff incentivizes storage
investment in the neighboring country (not visible in Fig. 4) because it allows active con-
sumers to decrease their peak consumption/injection.11 The extra storage investment in
the neighboring country, is not only used for reducing peak consumption/injection, but
11Note that these “additional” DER investments, i.e., investments in addition to those that occur in the
central planner reference scenario or under the fixed distribution tariff structure, are inefficient from a social
welfare perspective in the neighboring country because the total costs for consumers always increase. While
the investments of active consumers, from their perspective, are justified by lower energy and distribution
costs, the total amount of distribution costs does not decrease under the sunk cost assumption. As a result,
the DSO increases tariffs and, consequently, these avoided distribution costs are transferred to the passive
consumers in the neighboring country.
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also for price arbitrage. Arbitrage decreases the price spreads on the wholesale market. It
leads to lower energy costs for passive consumers in the reference country because it re-
duces demand-weighted average wholesale electricity prices. At the same time, it reduces
the arbitrage potential of storage because arbitrage is incentivized by price spreads. This
results in active consumers in the reference country not investing in storage (Fig. 4). The
subsequent investment cost savings outweigh the energy cost increase of active consumers.
Consequently, the total annual costs of both active and passive consumers in the reference
country decrease.
Net-metering tariff in neighboring country. Due to the volumetric tariff structure with net-
metering, active consumers in the neighboring country are incentivized to invest in 8.6 GW
of PV in total (not visible in Fig. 3), because PV production lowers the net consumption of
residential consumers. This massive PV investment only results in a small positive spillover
in terms of social welfare in the reference country, i.e., the costs of residential consumers are
0.3% lower than in the harmonized tariff scenario (Fig. 2). This result may seem counter-
intuitive as many reports and papers show how RES such as PV cause significant decreases in
wholesale electricity prices (Paraschiv et al., 2014; Ketterer, 2014). These authors, however,
analyze the short-run equilibrium, whereas we look at the long-run equilibrium. In the short
term, the rest of the electricity generation system cannot adapt to an increased penetration
of RES. As PV has a very low or zero marginal cost, base load power plants set the price
more often while peak load power plants are pushed out of the market. Consequently,
wholesale electricity prices decrease and conventional generators have difficulties to recover
their fixed costs due to the combination of lower prices and fewer running hours. In the
perfectly competitive long-run equilibrium, however, the conventional power plant capacities
are adapted so that every unit earns a zero profit, typically resulting in more peak- and mid-
load capacity and less base-load capacity. Usaola et al. (2009) show, using the screening
curve method, that in the long-run equilibrium, wholesale prices do not change with an
increasing penetration of wind. Green and Vasilakos (2011) find a similar result using a
long-run market equilibrium model. The PV investment in the neighboring country leads
to increased storage investments in the reference country, now totalling 1.6 GWh (Fig. 4),
because PV increases the price spreads between high- and low-price hours and consequently
the arbitrage potential of storage.
Neighboring country five times larger. We observe the same results concerning welfare and
PV investment (Fig. 2 and 3). In the scenario with a net-metering tariff in the neighboring
country, however, the storage investment increases from 1.6 GWh to 4.9 GWh (Fig. 4)
due to an increased impact of net-metering tariff induced PV investment in the neighboring
country on the arbitrage potential. Indeed, more PV investment in the neighboring country
leads to larger wholesale price spreads, which justifies higher storage investments in the
reference country.
3.2.2. Volumetric tariff with net-metering in the reference country
Similar to the previous section, we make four observations from Figures 2-4 (shaded, blue
areas). First, the welfare spillovers of the neighboring country moving towards a (unhar-
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monized) fixed or peak demand-based tariff are positive (Fig. 2). Second, there are no PV
investment spillovers (Fig. 3). Third, there are negative storage investment spillovers, i.e.,
storage is only installed when both countries impose a net-metering tariff structure (Fig. 4).
Finally, the welfare spillovers are larger if the neighboring country increases in size. Similar
to the previous section, we dedicate one paragraph to each tariff scenario, discussing our
first three observations for the case with equally sized countries. In the final paragraph, we
discuss the impact of country size.
Net-metering tariff in neighboring country. When the NRAs in both countries impose vol-
umetric net-metering tariffs, active consumers in both countries invest in 3.6 kW of PV
each, resulting in a total of 8.6 GW in the reference country (Fig. 3). This allows active
consumers to generate sufficient energy on an annual basis to avoid all distribution costs,
i.e., the annual net consumption of each active consumers is zero. This PV investment is
inefficient because the avoided distribution costs are merely transferred to passive consumers
through increased distribution tariffs. As a result, the total costs of residential consumers
in the reference country are 13.5% higher than in the central planner reference (Fig. 2).
A net-metering tariff disincentivizes storage investment because the losses in the storage
system increase the net consumption. In the harmonized tariff scenario, however, active
consumers in the reference country install 0.8 GWh of storage because the cost reductions
arising from price arbitrage outweigh the efficiency losses (Fig. 4).
Fixed tariff in neighboring country. In this scenario, the installed PV capacity in the neigh-
boring country decreases to zero. The PV investment in the reference country, however,
remains 8.6 GW since it allows the active consumers to shift all their distribution to the
passive consumers (Fig. 3). The storage investment in the reference country decreases to
zero (Fig. 4). All 1.6 GWh of storage is now installed in the neighboring country because a
fixed distribution tariff does not disincentivize storage like a volumetric net-metering tariff
does. The total cost increase of residential consumers in the reference country compared
to the central planner reference decreases to 12.1% (Fig. 2). This positive welfare spillover
in the reference country is explained by two factors impacting only active consumers: a
decrease of storage investment and an increase of the market value of PV, defined as the
average electricity price weighted for PV production (Hirth, 2013).12 Hirth (2013) shows
12The market value of PV is the amount of money that an active consumer will receive on average for each
MWh of electricity, produced by his PV system, if he would sell this energy on the wholesale market. It gives
a more accurate representation of the value of intermittent renewable energy sources than the often used
levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) because it takes into account the temporal value of PV (Joskow, 2011).
The market value can actually be compared to the LCOE in order to determine if PV investment is efficient.
In the optimal case, there is only PV investment if the LCOE is lower than or equal to the market value
because it implies that PV producers earn just enough or more than is needed to recover their investment
and operational costs. An LCOE higher than the market value of PV indicates that the PV investment is
inefficient, i.e., that it would be more efficient to buy from the wholesale market. Under a fixed distribution
tariff, consumers get undistorted energy prices, which leads them to the optimal investment decisions. Under
a net-metering tariff, consumers may be enticed to invest in PV even if the market value is lower than the
LCOE, because they can avoid distribution costs.
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empirically, and through numerical modeling, how the market value of PV decreases with
increasing PV penetration, defined as the share of PV production in the total amount of
produced electricity. This follows from the merit-order effect which entails that more zero
marginal cost PV production during a certain time step leads to lower wholesale prices at
that time step. In the harmonized tariff scenario, 8.6 GW of PV is installed in each country
resulting in a PV penetration of 9.6% and a market value of 35.6 e/MWh. If the neighboring
country imposes a fixed distribution tariff, the PV penetration decreases to 4.8%, resulting
in a market value of 40.3 e/MWh. Resulting from the increase in market value and the de-
crease in storage investment, the costs of active consumers in the reference country decrease
from 354.7 e/year/consumer in the harmonized tariff scenario to 338.0 e/year/consumer in
the scenario with a fixed tariff in the neighboring country. The costs of passive consumers,
however, do not change as the PV investment does not impact the average wholesale electric-
ity prices in the long-run (cf. Section 3.2.1). Under a net-metering tariff, the positive welfare
spillovers are thus for the active consumers while there is no impact on passive consumers.
Peak demand-based tariff in neighboring country. In this scenario, the positive welfare
spillovers are larger than in the previous scenario: the cost increase of residential consumers
in the reference country compared to the central planner reference is 11.9% instead of 12.1%.
The extra storage investment in the neighboring country (5 GWh under a peak demand-
based tariff compared to 1.6 GWh under a fixed tariff), increases the market value of PV
(from 40.3 e/MWh to 40.6 e/MWh) and decreases the average wholesale electricity price
weighted for the demand of passive consumers (from 54.7 e/MWh to 54.6 e/MWh). Both
active and passive consumers in the reference country thus profit from the extra storage
investment in the neighboring country, although the impact is limited to 0.2 pp.
Neighboring country five times larger. The mechanisms described in the previous two para-
graphs are strengthened because the impact of the tariff structure in the neighboring country
on the PV penetration increases. If the neighboring country imposes a fixed tariff, the pene-
tration of 8.6 GW of PV in the reference country is 1.6% instead of 4.8%. Consequently, the
market value of PV is 44.7 e/MWh instead of 40.3 e/MWh and the costs of active consumers
in the reference country are 323.9 e/year/consumer instead of 338.0 e/year/consumer. If
the neighboring country imposes a net-metering tariff, the PV penetration equals 9.6% re-
gardless of the country size, since all active consumers in both countries install 3.6 kW of PV.
This leads to the same costs of 354.7 e/year per active consumer in the reference country.
The positive welfare spillovers of an unharmonized fixed tariff structure in the neighboring
country thus increase if the neighboring country increases in size, i.e., the total cost increase
of residential consumers in the reference country compared to the central planner reference
decreases from 12.1% to 11% (Fig. 2). The same reasoning applies for the scenario with a
peak demand-based tariff structure in the neighboring country.
3.2.3. Peak demand-based tariff in the reference country
We again make four observations from Figures 2-4 (shaded, green areas). We then de-
vote one paragraph to each tariff scenario, discussing the first three observations for the
case with equally sized countries, and a final paragraph to the fourth observation. First, the
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welfare spillovers of an unharmonized tariff structure (a fixed or volumetric net-metering
tariff in the neighboring country) are negative (Fig. 2). Second, there is no PV investment
in any scenario (Fig. 3). Third, storage investment increases when the neighboring country
imposes an unharmonized tariff structure (Fig. 4). Finally, the welfare and storage invest-
ment spillovers are larger if the neighboring country increases in size, and the size of the
neighboring country determines which tariff structure causes the largest spillover effects.
Peak demand-based tariff in neighboring country. In the harmonized tariff scenario, the
storage investment in the reference country equals 2.3 GWh (Fig. 4), while there is no PV
investment because PV does not allow reducing the peak consumption that occurs during
winter evenings in Belgium (Fig. 3). The cost increase of residential consumers compared
to the central planner reference is 0.4% (Fig. 2). The storage investment, and the resulting
consumer costs, depend on how active consumers utilize their storage systems. On one hand,
active consumers perform price arbitrage, which lowers the total costs for consumers and
disincentivizes further storage investments as the arbitrage potential decreases. On the other
hand, active consumers use storage to lower their peak demand, subsequently transferring
distribution costs to passive consumers, incentivizing further storage investments as the
distribution tariffs increase. Both activities can be carried out by the same storage system,
but consumers always make a trade-off.13 In this scenario, we observe a limited amount
of storage investment and a limited cost increase for residential consumers in the reference
country, implying that the inefficient non-cooperative behavior of active consumers is limited.
Fixed tariff in neighboring country. Compared to the harmonized tariff scenario, the stor-
age investments in the neighboring country decrease. The subsequent increased arbitrage
potential of storage results in an increased storage investment of 3.3 GWh in the reference
country (Fig. 4). The total cost increase of residential consumers in the reference country
also increases to 0.9% (Fig. 2), i.e., there are negative spillovers. This implies that active
consumers use this extra storage at least partly to transfer distribution costs to passive
consumers.
Net-metering tariff in neighboring country. We observe the same effects as in the previous
scenario, but they are more pronounced. The storage investment in the reference country
is 5.0 GWh (Fig. 4) and the total cost increase is 2.0% (Fig. 2). At first sight, the
stronger spillover effects of the net-metering tariff may seem obvious. This tariff initially
increases the arbitrage potential of storage more than a fixed tariff, because it induces
PV investment in the neighboring country, leading to increased wholesale market price
spreads. When countries are of equal size, the tariff structure in the neighboring country
that leads to the greatest initial arbitrage potential of storage ultimately leads to the largest
storage investment and the worst manifestation of non-cooperative behavior in the reference
country. However, these observations should not be generalized, as we show in the following
paragraph.
13This trade-off is reflected in the objective function (2) of the consumers’ optimization problems, in which
they minimize the sum of their investment, distribution and energy costs.
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Neighboring country five times larger. We observe more storage investment in the reference
country in the unharmonized tariff scenarios if the neighboring country increases in size:
8.5 GWh in the fixed tariff scenario and 7.8 GWh in the net-metering tariff scenario (Fig.
4). This is caused by a dampening of the disincentivizing market force, i.e., the arbitrage
potential of storage does not decrease as rapidly with increased storage investment due to
the increased size of the combined wholesale market. We also observe larger negative welfare
spillovers in the reference country: the cost increase of residential consumers compared to
the central planner reference is 3.8% in the fixed tariff scenario and 3.0% in the net-metering
tariff scenario, while it remains at 0.4% in the harmonized tariff scenario (Fig. 2). The extra
storage in the reference country is thus partly used to transfer more distribution costs to pas-
sive consumers. However, the spillover effects of the fixed tariff are larger than those of the
volumetric net-metering tariff. In contrast to what we saw previously, a net-metering tariff
in the neighboring country does not lead to a further strengthening of the non-cooperative
behavior. In this case, the increased arbitrage potential of storage incentivizes consumers in
the reference country to focus more on arbitrage instead of peak reduction. In the resulting
equilibrium, active consumers install less storage than in the scenario with a fixed tariff. As
a result, the energy costs of passive consumers decrease, less distribution costs are trans-
ferred to passive consumers and active consumers save on investment costs. This example
shows that the long-term spillover effects of distribution tariff structures are difficult to pre-
dict when there is a peak demand-based tariff in the reference country impacting storage
investment. They are (i) the result of a complex trade-off embedded in the objectives of
residential consumers, who minimize both energy and distribution costs, and (ii) dependent
on load profiles, technical characteristics of storage systems, country size, etc.
4. Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper, we analyzed the spillover effects of distribution grid tariffs in neighboring
countries with coupled wholesale markets. We quantified these effects, complementing the
insights of other researchers on the direct effects of distribution grid tariffs, e.g. (Schit-
tekatte et al., 2018; Abdelmotteleb et al., 2018). To this end, we developed a novel market
equilibrium model which captures the wholesale market effects of distribution grid tariffs.
In a case study, we studied the long-run market equilibrium in nine scenarios, spanning all
combinations of three distinct distribution grid tariff designs (a tariff consisting of a fixed
charge, a tariff consisting of a volumetric charge with net-metering and a tariff consisting of a
peak demand charge) in two countries. We compared the costs of residential consumers and
DER investments in different scenarios in order to study the welfare and DER investment
spillovers respectively. Our main findings are the following:
1. Concerning welfare, there are positive spillovers in a country that imposes a fixed or
net-metering tariff when the neighboring country imposes a different, unharmonized
tariff structure. In our case study, the total costs of residential consumers compared
to a central planner reference decrease up to -1.6 pp when countries are equal in size
and up to -3.0 pp if the neighboring country is five times larger. The welfare spillover
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from an unharmonized tariff structure is negative in a country that imposes a peak
demand-based tariff. The total costs of residential consumers compared to a central
planner reference increase up to +1.6 pp when both countries are equal in size and up
to +3.4 pp if the neighboring country is five times larger.
2. Concerning PV investment, there are no spillover effects. Under a fixed or a peak
demand-based tariff, there are no PV investments, because PV is not economically
viable from a wholesale market perspective under our cost assumptions. Under a net-
metering tariff, active consumers massively invest in PV in order to shift distribution
costs to passive consumers, but this incentive is so large that it is not impacted by
wholesale market effects.
3. Concerning storage investment, there are clear spillover effects of which the direction
and magnitude differ widely between different scenarios. In the most extreme scenario
in our case study, i.e., a peak demand-based tariff, the total storage investment varies
from 2.3 GWh to 5.0 GWh when both countries are equal in size and from 2.3 GWh
to 8.5 GWh when the neighboring country is five times larger. Storage investment
always depends on the arbitrage potential on the wholesale market. Under a peak
demand-based tariff, consumers also use storage for peak reduction which results in
a trade-off between arbitrage and peak reduction. This trade-off leads to different
results depending on the setting.
These findings indicate that there can be significant positive and negative welfare
spillovers of unharmonized distribution tariff structures in coupled wholesale markets. These
welfare spillovers are thus not a clear argument for harmonization as a country may be bet-
ter off with unharmonized tariffs. However, it is important to note that the positive welfare
spillovers in one country always follow from – from a system perspective – inefficient DER
investments in the neighboring country. This has two implications. First, the total welfare
in both countries does not necessarily increase. Second, these inefficient DER investments
are the result of distribution grid tariffs implicitly subsidizing DERs, which may be seen as
a form of state aid, i.e., another argument for harmonization. Implicit DER subsidies in
one country also impact DER investments in the other country. We observe, for instance,
less storage investment in the reference country when the neighboring country imposes peak
demand-based tariffs, serving as implicit subsidies for storage in the neighboring country.
We focused on the impact of distribution tariffs on DER investments and consumer
welfare, while ensuring cost recovery for DSOs. In practice, however, tariff design is a
compromise between a multitude of design principles, e.g. cost reflectivity, cost recovery,
simplicity, fairness, etc. (CEER, 2017). It is not straightforward to determine the relative
importance of these principles. This strengthens the case of the stakeholders that cite
“local specificities” as an argument against harmonization, as one country may assign more
importance to a certain principle than another country. Therefore, we do not claim to provide
a final answer on the question of harmonization of distribution grid tariffs. However, we are
the first to quantify some of the elements which are important in this discussion, i.e. welfare
and DER investment spillovers.
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For future work, in order to deepen our insights, certain assumptions of our analysis
could be relaxed. We give two examples. First, relaxing the sunk cost assumption by
making a portion of the distribution costs variable and dependent on consumers’ actions
could lead to interesting insights, since the DSO cost structure is not necessarily the same
in each country. Second, we could relax one or more of the assumptions that allows us to
model an idealized market, e.g., non-binding transmission capacity, no renewable subsidies,
etc. This would give insights in the interaction between the distribution tariff design and
other market imperfections. Our analysis can also be extended by including more scenarios
with different distribution tariff structures, country sizes, cost parameters, etc. We could
also have a closer look at fairness issues by separately analyzing the costs of active and
passive consumers. Another direction for future work is to look at the short- and medium-
term spillover effects. This would require significant additions to our model with generation
capacity being fixed for a certain amount of time, instead of assuming a complete greenfield
as we did in this work.
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Appendix A.
Appendix A.1. Equivalent optimization problem
We follow the method of Poncelet (2018) to derive an optimization problem, equivalent
to the “simplified” non-cooperative game (2)-(26), which does not include the optimization
problems of the DSOs. Note that the distribution tariffs tarfixi , tar
nm
i and tar
pd
i are param-
eters in this non-cooperative game. The objective of the equivalent optimization problem
is equal to the sum of all terms without dual variables in the objectives of the optimization
problems of residential consumers Ci,j (Eq. (2)), conventional generators Gi,k (Eq. (17)),
renewable generators Ri (Eq. (20)) and market coupling agent MCO (Eq. (24)). All
constraints of the aforementioned optimization problems are constraints of the equivalent
optimization problem. The optimization problems of the market clearing agents MCLi are
integrated by including the market clearing equations as constraints, of which the whole-
sale electricity prices λt,i are dual variables. The equivalent optimization problem is thus
described by Eq.(A.1)-(A.22):
Minimize
∑
i∈I
(∑
k∈K
(
ICconvk ·capconvi,k +
∑
t∈T
VCk ·gconvt,i,k
)
+ ICw ·capwi
+
∑
j∈J
Ni,j ·
(
ICpv ·cappvi,j + ICs ·capsi,j + ufixi ·tarfixi
+ unmi ·tarnmi ·wneti,j + updi ·tarpdi ·wpeaki,j
))
+
∑
t∈T
CT·ft (A.1)
subject to
wt,i,j = Dt,i,j+cht,i,j−dct,i,j−gpvt , ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (αt,i,j) (A.2)
0 6 gpvt,i,j 6 LFpvt,i ·cappvi,j, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (β-i,j, β+i,j) (A.3)
et,i,j = et−1,i,j + cht,i,j ·EC− dct,i,j/ED, ∀t∈T \{1}, i∈I, j∈J (γt,i,j) (A.4)
e1,i,j = cap
s
i,j/2 + ch1,i,j ·EC− dc1,i,j/ED, ∀i∈I, j∈J (γ1,i,j) (A.5)
eT,i,j = cap
s
i,j/2, ∀i∈I, j∈J (δi,j) (A.6)
0 6 et,i,j 6 capsi,j, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (-t,i,j, +t,i,j) (A.7)
0 6 cht,i,j 6 CR·capsi,j, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (ζ -t,i,j, ζ+t,i,j) (A.8)
0 6 dct,i,j 6 CR·capsi,j, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (η-t,i,j, η+t,i,j) (A.9)
0 6 cappvi,j 6 cappvi,j, ∀i∈I, j∈J (θ-i,j, θ+i,j) (A.10)
0 6 capsi,j 6 capsi,j, ∀i∈I, j∈J (ι-i,j, ι+i,j) (A.11)∑
t∈T
wt,i,j 6 wneti,j , ∀i∈I, j∈J (κ1i,j) (A.12)
0 6 wneti,j , ∀i∈I, j∈J (κ2i,j) (A.13)
wt,i,j 6 wpeaki,j , ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (µ1t,i,j) (A.14)
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− wt,i,j 6 wpeaki,j , ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (µ2t,i,j) (A.15)
0 6 gconvt,i,k 6 capconvi,k , ∀t∈T , i∈I, k∈K (ν-t,i,k, ν+t,i,k) (A.16)
0 6 capconvi,k , ∀i∈I, k∈K (ξi,k) (A.17)
0 6 gwt,i 6 LFwt,i ·capwi , ∀t∈T , i∈I (o-t,i, o+t,i) (A.18)
0 6 capwi , ∀i∈I (pii) (A.19)∑
i∈I
at,i = 0, ∀t∈T (ρt) (A.20)
ft > at,i, ∀t∈T , i∈I (σt,i) (A.21)∑
k∈K
gconvt,i,k + g
w
t,i + at,i = D
nres
t,i +
∑
j∈J
Ni,j ·wt,i,j, ∀t∈T , i∈I (λt,i) (A.22)
Appendix A.2. KKT conditions
The constraints of the optimization problem (A.2)-(A.22), along with stationarity equa-
tions (A.23)-(A.38) and complementary slackness conditions (A.39)-(A.61), form the KKT
conditions of optimization problem (A.1)-(A.22). These KKT conditions can also be derived
from the “simplified” non-cooperative game (2)-(26) which shows that both formulations are
equivalent.
− αt,i,j + κ1i,j + µ1t,i,j − µ2t,i,j + Ni,j ·λt,i = 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.23)
Ni,j ·ICpv −
∑
t∈T
β+t,i,j ·LFpvt,i − θ-i,j + θ+i,j = 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.24)
Ni,j ·ICs −
∑
t∈T
(
+t,i,j+CR(ζ
+
t,i,j+η
+
t,i,j)
)
+ (γ1,i,j+δi,j)/2− ι-i,j + ι+i,j = 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J
(A.25)
− αt,i,j − β-t,i,j + β+t,i,j = 0, ∀t ∈ T , i∈I, j∈J (A.26)
− γt,i,j + γt+1,i,j − -t,i,j + +t,i,j = 0, ∀t ∈ T \{T}, i∈I, j∈J (A.27)
− γT,i,j − δi,j − -T,i,j + +T,i,j = 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.28)
αt,i,j + γt,i,j ·EC− ζ -t,i,j + ζ+t,i,j = 0, ∀t ∈ T , i∈I, j∈J (A.29)
− αt,i,j − γt,i,j/ED− η-t,i,j + η+t,i,j = 0, ∀t ∈ T , i∈I, j∈J (A.30)
Ni,j ·unmi ·tarnmi − κ1i,j − κ2i,j = 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.31)
Ni,j ·updi ·tarpdi −
∑
t∈T
(µ1t,i,j + µ
2
t,i,j) = 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.32)
VCk − λt,i − ν-t,i,k + ν+t,i,k = 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, k∈K (A.33)
ICconvk −
∑
t∈T
ν+t,k,i − ξi,k = 0, ∀i∈I, k∈K (A.34)
− λt,i − o-t,i + o+t,i = 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I (A.35)
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ICw −
∑
t∈T
o+t,i ·LFwt,i − pii = 0, (A.36)
− λt,i − ρt + σt,i = 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I (A.37)
CT−
∑
i∈I
σt,i = 0, ∀t∈T (A.38)
0 ≤ β-t,i,j ⊥gpvt,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.39)
0 ≤ β+t,i,j ⊥LFpvt,i ·cappvi,j − gpvt,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.40)
0 ≤ -t,i,j ⊥et,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.41)
0 ≤ +t,i,j ⊥capsi,j − et,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.42)
0 ≤ ζ -t,i,j ⊥cht,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.43)
0 ≤ ζ+t,i,j ⊥CR·capsi,j − cht,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.44)
0 ≤ η-t,i,j ⊥dct,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.45)
0 ≤ η+t,i,j ⊥CR·capsi,j − dct,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.46)
0 ≤ θ-i,j ⊥cappvi,j ≥ 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.47)
0 ≤ θ+i,j ⊥cappvi,j − cappvi,j ≥ 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.48)
0 ≤ ι-i,j ⊥capsi,j ≥ 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.49)
0 ≤ ι+i,j ⊥capsi,j − capsi,j ≥ 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.50)
0 ≤ κ1i,j ⊥wneti,j −
∑
t∈T
wt,i,j ≥ 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.51)
0 ≤ κ2i,j ⊥wneti,j ≥ 0, ∀i∈I, j∈J (A.52)
0 ≤ µ1t,i,j ⊥wpeaki,j − wt,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.53)
0 ≤ µ2t,i,j ⊥wpeaki,j + wt,i,j ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, j∈J (A.54)
0 ≤ ν-t,i,k ⊥gconvt,i,k ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, k∈K (A.55)
0 ≤ ν+t,i,k ⊥capconvi,k − gconvt,i,k ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I, k∈K (A.56)
0 ≤ ξi,k ⊥capconvi,k ≥ 0, ∀i∈I, k∈K (A.57)
0 ≤ o-t,i ⊥gwt,i ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I (A.58)
0 ≤ o+t,i ⊥LFwt,i ·capwi − gwt,i ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I (A.59)
0 ≤ pii ⊥capwi ≥ 0, ∀i∈I (A.60)
0 ≤ σt,i ⊥ft − at,i ≥ 0, ∀t∈T , i∈I (A.61)
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